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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
JOHN P. JORDON,
Plaintiff,
v.
REMCO, INC., a Utah Corporation,
et ah,
Defendants and
Appellants.
DAVID J. WAGSTAFF, etc.,
Third Party Plaintiff
and Respondent,

Case No.
13690

v.
REMCO, INC., etal,
Third Party Defendants
and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This case involves a Subcontract Agreement for all
drywall work on a 60 unit apartment complex constructed
in Cedar City, Utah, entered into between the third party
plaintiff, David J. Wagstaff, dba Triangle Drywall
referred to in this brief as Triangle and the third party
defendant Remco Inc., referred to in this brief as Remco.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court Judge, J. Harlan Burns, after hearing
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the testimony and observing the documents which were
introduced, awarded judgment for Triangle in the principal sum of $4,064.94, interest in the sum of $325.20 plus an
attorney's fee of $1600.00 for a total judgment of $5,990.14.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment entered
and that the case be remanded for findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment which legally corresponds
to the factual evidence presented and pursuant to the
argument set forth herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Remco Inc., entered into a subcontract agreement with
David J. Wagstaff, dba Triangle Drywall on the 19th day of
May, 1972. Triangle was to do all the drywall work on the 60
unit apartment complex being constructed by Remco in
Cedar City, Utah for the sum of $47, 383.00, to be completed
by August 1, 1972. (Pi's. Ex. 2).
In preforming the contract, Triangle was falling behind
in their work as acknowledged by David J. Wagstaff. (Tr.
32). In an effort to rectify the situation, they assigned a
portion of the work to Christiansen Drywall, (Tr. 32, 56 and
57), and to David Cranmer. (Tr. 79). Mr. Richins, who
represented Remco, made numerous contacts with Mr.
Wagstaff in an effort to keep the job moving. (Tr. 124 to 135
and 166). Mr. Sid Miller, the job superintendent, felt he had
to get the drywall job in progress and therefore hired
Robert Barwick. (Tr. 65). Finally, on the 1st day of September, Remco was required to step in and finish
Triangle's job. (Tr. 167).
9
Disregarding the monetary value of Remco's work in
behalf of Triangle in stocking the drywall, (Tr. 82 and R.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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23), and in cleaning up and hauling trash, (Tr. 83, 85 and R.
23), the total payments made by Remco to Triangle or in
their behalf was $49,966.62; the said payments were as
follows: $4709.00 to James Cody and David Cranmer (Def s
Exs. 2 and 5); $3458.62 to Christiansen Drywall, to which
Triangle agreed with $3,144.20 (Tr. 151); $1550.00 to Bobby
Barwick (Tr. 151) to which Triangle agreed with $900.00
(Tr. 13); $758.00 to Southern Utah Lumber (Tr. 152), to
which Triangle agreed with $55.51 (Tr. 47), and $272.65 to
Iron County Lumber (Tr. 148). The direct payments to
Triangle or in their behalf to Capitol Supply and the Internal Revenue Service, to which Triangle concurs, were
$39,218.35 (Def 's Ex. 10 and Tr. 7,46, and 140).
Triangle placed a lien on the property which was subscribed to on October 5, 1972 for the sum of $13,673.00.
(Defs Ex. 8). Triangle was informed of Remco's position
that the lien was wrongfully placed on January 19, 1973.
(Defs Ex. 17). Triangle refused to release its lien even
with the payment into court of the full amount of its claim
(R. 7) and the knowledge that payments to all its suppliers
and sub-contractors had been made (R. 10). A motion for
the release of the lien (R. 9) was granted, (R. 11), but
required placing with the clerk of the court the sum of
$13,216.61 of Remco's funds. An attempt was made by
Remco's attorney to place the funds in an interest bearing
certificate of deposit on the 24th day of September, 1973,
(R. 19), although this had not been done at the time of the
dispersal of the funds on January 23,1974. (R. 30).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
THE DEFENDANT HAD BREACHED THE SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The sub-contract agreement, (Pis, Ex. 2), provides,
among other things, as follows:
"8. Subcontractor agrees to start work May 24,
1972 with four men, and will keep four to six men
on project as long as they can be used effectively
and other crafts do not cause them delays.
3. Subcontractor shall prosecute his work with due
diligence so as not to delay the work of Contractor
or other subcontractors etc.
1. The agreement between Contractor and Owner
requires that the work to be performed must be
completed by August 1, 1972/'
Triangle failed to comply with the foregoing provisions
by falling behind in the work as testified to by David J.
Wagstaff. (Tr. 32). David Cranmer also testified that the
drywall work was considerably behind \yhen he started
working in the first part of July. (Tr. 79). Mr. Richins
contacted Triangle, through Mr. Wagstaff and Mr. Jensen,
on numerous occasions in an effort to get sufficient men on
the job to comply with the contract terms, but had little
success (Tr. 124 to 135). Further efforts to keep the drywall
work progressing were made by the job superintendent,
Sid Miller, in hiring Robert Barwick. (Tr. 65). Finally,
some thirty days after Triangle was to have had the job
completed, Remco took over the drywall work and paid for
its completion. (Tr. 167).

Paragraph 18 of the contract provides:
" Subcontractor agrees not to sublet, transfer or
assign this agreement or any part thereof without
the written consent of contractor.''
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Triangle proceeded by subletting work to Christiansen
Drywall, (Tr. 32,56 and 57), and to David Cranmer. (Tr. 32
and 73). The obvious reason for having the provision
against subletting is that without it you lose control of the
progress and often times the quality of the job, (Tr. 124),
which is precisely what occurred.
Triangle was to be paid on the 10th day of each month for
the previous months work. However, only one bill was ever
submitted by Triangle and payments were made through
verbal requests. (Tr. 177). Because of this situation, and
the levy by the Internal Revenue Service, Mr. Richins had
certain reservations about paying them. (Tr. 176 and 177).
Even though the Court construed the contract strongly
against Remco, (Tr. 183), it is submitted that the strength
of the construction should not have, been so formidable as
to withstand the penetration of Triangle's breach, and the
failure of the Court to so find was error.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING REMCO'S
CLAIM OF $20.00 PER DAY FOR TRIANGLES
FAILURE TO CANCEL THE LIEN
Utah Code Annotated 38-1-24 provides:
"The claimant of any lien filed as provided herein,
on the payment of the amount thereof together
with the costs incurred and the fees for cancellation, shall at the request to be cancelled of
record within ten days from the request, and upon
failure to so cancel his lien within the time
aforesaid shall forfeit and pay to the person
making the request the sum of $20.00 per day until
the same shall be cancelled, to be recovered in the
same manner as other debts/'
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The initial written notification by Remco to Triangle
tMt fho iTPt» ' hc/been wrongfully placed wae on January
19, 1973 by letter from Remco's attorney to Triangle's
attorney with a copy to David J. Wagstaff. (Def's. Ex. 17).
Remco's attorney, as authorized by Triangle's attorney,
contacted Mr. Wagstaff directly in the latter part of July
1973 in an effort to get the lien released upon payment of
his alleged claim plus 25 Percent, but Triangle refused to
release lien. (R 7). Remco was then required, by motion
(R. 9), to get the Court to order the release of the lien
which was so ordered on the 9th day of August, 1973 upon
Remco depositing with the Clerk of the Court the sum of
$13,216 61. (R. 11).
It is Remco's position that a lien placed for an
unreasonable amount is just as wrongful as placing a lien
where it is not justified. Triangles position, which was
taken by the Court, is that even if only $1.00 was owing the
lien was proper, and whether the lien was placed for $5.00
or $50,000.00 the statutory provision became meaningless.
If Section 38-1-21 is to have any meaning at all, then it
should be applied in the instant case. 53 Am Jur 2d
Mechanics Liens, Section 235 deals with this problem in
stating:

"Where an overstatement of the amount due and
sought to be recovered by virtue of a mechanic's
lien is made intentionally and with a design to
defraud, it is generally held that the entire lien
must fail. Such a rule, or a very similar one, is
expressly stated in some statutes, and in some
jurisdictions the statutes go beyond this rule and
additionally provide that the owner may recover a
civil penalty for wilful exaggeration.
Even in the absence of a fraudulent purpose, liens
have been declared void where the claim was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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grossly and intentionally exaggerated, or where
it was much greater than the claimant honestly
believed due. Where the claimant asserted a lien
for more than $5,000 while the court held that only
some $1,500 was due and unpaid, the amount
claimed was so excessive as to preclude the
likelihood of a mistake made in good faith and to
support a finding that the plaintiff intentionally
claimed an amount greater than that which was
justly due him. "
In Section 241 there is an expression of how the amount
of the lien is to be determined:
".While there is some authority that a mechanic's
lien is valid only to the extent of the actual cost of
the work and materials used up to the time work
under the contract was stopped which excludes
from the lien, profits or prospective profits to the
contractor, and although, where there has been
substantial performance of the contract before it
is terminated, the courts have frequently permitted recovery and a mechanic's lien based on
the contract price less the cost of completion, a
great number of cases hold that the reasonable
value of the work done and materials supplied,
rather than the actual cost thereof, constitutes the
amount for which a mechanic's lien may be obtained by a contractor who fails to complete the
contract work through no fault of his own. In
some states, statutes limit this rule by providing
for a reasonable recovery for the work performed
in proportion to the price for the entire contract. ''
A statement of the Court in Brennan v. White et al 97
Michigan 182,56NW354,reflects why the amounts set forth
on liens must be correct as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Liens laws are recognized as harsh remedies,
and when, as by our statute, parties are required
to file 'just and true statements of the demand
over and above all legal set-offs, ' equity treats as
insufficient a statement which is largely excessive. Parties are not permitted to include
speculative items in their claims, thereby incumbering the lands of others with untrue and
unjust claims; and, as the means of information is
within their reach, they are held to a degree of
accuracy greater than may be necessary in mere
actions upon demands.''
The instant case represents a situation going beyond the
actual placement of the lien. In July of 1973, Remco,
through their attorney, requested that Triangle release its
lien upon placing $11,522.41 with the Court, (R. 7) which
was refused. Remco was then required to obtain an order
of the Court and place $13,216.61 with the Court. (R. 11),
even though their total claim at that time and at the time of
trial was $4,064.94. Triangle never did release or cancel the
lien. Even under these circumstances, Triangle moved to
reinstate the lien, (R. 15), to which Remco responded. (R.
16).
With the lien being placed for an exaggerated amount,
Triangle refusing to cancel the lien of record upon the
payment of the amount,with costs incurred and the fees for
cancellation, and the requirement of placing with the
Court an amount which was in excess of three times the
actual claim, the situation represents an abuse for which
the statute was intended. Not only was there a refusal on
Triangle's part to cancel the lien, but also the additional
abuse of requiring the payment of the $13,216.61.
The minimum amount of time for which Remco should
be entitled to the $20.00 per day, is from the time of
refusing to cancel the lien, requiring the order of the Court,
(R. 11),on August 9,1973, until the parties stipulated to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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dispersing of the funds, after the trial, on January 23, 1974,
This is a period of 152 days for which Remco should be
entitled to $3040.00
POINT III
T H E C 0 U R T E R R E D I N DECLARING A FORFEITURE IN HOLDING THAT TRIANGLE NEITHER
HAD TO FINISH THE DRYWALL WORK OR PAY THE
AMOUNT TO HAVE THE WORK FINISHED OR PAY
FOR MATERIALS REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE
JOB.
The Court held that upon the breach by Remco, Triangle
was entitled to the full contract price but the obligation for
performance was forfeited. Fortunately for Remco,
Triangle continued to perform some work and they concurred with portions of the payments to Christiansen
Drywall, Barwick Drywall, and Southern Utah Lumber.
Remco submits that the Court erred in not accounting for
the remainder of the Iron County Lumber obligation,
(Def's Ex. 6) or the Southern Utah Lumber obligation
(Def s Ex. 6), when the materials could only have been
used for the drywall job and were delivered to the project.
(Tr. 76 and 116). The Court in not accounting for the •
payments made to James Cody and David Cranmer
(Defs Ex. 2 and 5), resulted in a forfeiture in the amount
of $4,709.00, although the amount was reasonable to
complete the job, (Tr. 84, 104, 158, 159, and 160), and
Remco certainly was not paying gratuities at that point.
In holding as the Court did, the conclusion is that in any
contract, if payment is not made on the precise due date,
the party who has not been paid need no longer perform,
but is entitled to the full contract price. It is suggested that
such a conclusion if concurred with by this Court, will lead
to contractual chaos.
The entire analysis of this Coui t in "i t n trig t H ai xsei i, 11 7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Utah 591, 218 P2d 666, is appropriate in application to the
present factual circumstances, wherein it was stated:
"The contract did not provide for retention of the
money and even if it did, it is questionable that
such a provision could be enforced, as defendants
would acquire an unconscionable advantage and
be unjustly enriched at the expense of plaintiffs as
there is no showing that defendants have suffered
any damage. . . .Even though the plaintiff's
breach is wilful and without semblance of excuse,
the defendant must restore the excess of benefit
over harm if, with knowledge that the breach has
occurred or is impending, he assents to the part
performance, or retains it or accepts the benefit of
it unreasonably."
Even where forfeiture clauses have been involved, this
Court has not upheld them if the amount involved is
disproportionate to the damages actually sustained.
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P2d 446.
POINTIV
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
THERE WAS A WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL WHEN
TRIANGLE CONTINUED WITH ITS PERFORMANCE
AFTER THE BREACH OF THE SPECIAL PROVISION
OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE SUBCONTRACT
AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE
PAYMENT OF MATERIALS.

The Court held that Remco breached the agreement by
failing to make the payment as provided in the special
provision of paragraph 5 (Tr. 183). This was presumably
breached on the 19th day of June, 1973 which was thirty
days after the execution of the agreement on the 19th day
of May 1973. It should be noted, however, that the demand
by Triangle was $20,000.00 for the sheetrock which acDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cording to Mr. Wagstaff cost $14,580.<Mi T* (4 , and according to Mr. Richins would cost approximately
$12,000.00 (Tr. 154). This was of concern to Mr. Richins,
(Tr. 173), but based on the Court's holding his concern was
ill-founded.
'I he specific legal situation where performance is
continued is covered in 143 ALR at page 496 which states:
"Ui ider ordinary circumstances, where there is
an existing actual breach of contract, of a
character going to the essence, the innocent party
(having in such case the right to go on with performance, oi to rescind, or to stop performance
and seek damages as for total breach) will, if he
insists on performance notwithstanding the
breach, keep alive his own obligation to continue
with performance, with the result that the party at
fault, even though having in the interval done
nothing in reliance on a continuance of performance, may, if he sees fit, turn about and hold
the innocent party to performance."
The waiver aspect of the breach is discussed, in 17 Am
Jur 2d section 447, entitled waiver of breach; election to
continue performance. The appropriate language as applied to the instant case is as follows:
"Where there has been a material breach which
does not indicate an intention to repudiate the
remainder of the contract, the injured party has
an election of continuing performance, or of
ceasing to perform, or of repudiating the contract. Any act by the injured party indicating an
intent to continue will operate as a conclusive
election, riot depriving him of his right of action
for the hi each which has already taken place, but
depriving him of any excuse for ceasing perinrnnrco on his own. part. I Jnder ordinary cirDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12

cumstances where there is an existing actual
breach of contract of a character going to the
essence, the innocent party will, if he insists on
performance notwithstanding the breach, keep
alive his own obligation to continue with performance, with the result that the party at fault,
even though having in the interval done nothing in
reliance on a continuance of performance, may, if
he sees fit, turn about and hold the innocent party
to performance. In other words, a party may
waive a breach by the other party and then be
liable for his own subsequent breach. "

In Schnepfv. Thomas L. McNamara, Inc., 354 Mich. 393,
93 NW 2d 232, a very similiar factual situation was
presented to the Court. In holding that the injured party
had waived its right to terminate the contract the Court
stated:
"Did defendant's change of the location for sand
loading operations constitute a breach of contract
relieving plaintiff from the obligation to supply a
sufficient number of trucks at all times? Plaintiff
continued operations under the written contract
for a number of days after such change of location
and up to the April 21 meeting without protest and
without claiming breach of contract or asserting
its termination. The record does not indicate that
he made such claim at any time prior to suit. By
continuing thus to perform and to accept
payments under it, as above noted, he lost his
right, if any, to terminate the contract and declare
it forfeited. Robinson v. Lake Shore & M.S.
Railway Co., 103 Mich. 607, 61 N.W. 1014.
'It was appellant's duty, when it discovered the
apparent breach of the contract, if it intended to
insist upon a forfeiture, to do so at once. By perDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mitting appellees to proceed with the performance of the contract it waived a breach. '
Grayson-McLeod Lumber Co. v. Slack-Kress Tie
& Stave Co ] 02 Ark 79, 143 S.W. 581, 583.
" Where there has been a material breach which
does not indicate an intention to repudiate the
remainder of the contract, the injured party has a
genuine election either of continuing performance
oi of ceasing to perform. Any act indicating an
intent to continue will operate as a conclusive
election, not indeed of depriving him of a right of
action for the breach which has already taken
place, but depriving him of any excuse for ceasing
performance on his own part. Anything which
draws on the other party to execute the agreement
after the default in respect of time or which shows
that it is deemed a subsisting agreement after
such default will amount to a waiver.' (Italics
ours.) 12 Am. Jur. p. 968, s 390." Sinclair Refining
; Co, v. Costin, Tex. Civ, App,f 116 S.W. 2d 894, 898 "
A similiar result was reached by the Court in Snowball v.
Maney Bros. & Co. 39 Wyo. 84, 270 P 167, wherein the Court
held:
4

'We do not think that there were two contracts in
the case at bar, but that all the work by the
plaintiff was done under the written contract. A
man cannot blow both hot and cold. He cannot
treat a contract in force and effect, and then sue
for its breach, upon the theory that it was
repudiated by the opposite party. If he acts on the
theory that it is still in force, the breach, if any, is
waived/'
The statement of this Court in Prudential Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 7 Utah 2d 366, 325 P2d 899, also seems
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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applicable, the statement being:
"Furthermore, it is a recognized principle of
contract law that a breach of an insubstantial
nature, which is severable and does not vitally
change the transaction, does not release the other
party completely from performing his obligations
- under the contract, but gives rise to a right for
damages for any loss occasioned thereby. "
The case at hand involved a situation where there was a
waiver of the breach, although Triangle should have been
entitled to any damages caused by the breach, if any there
were. Triangle continued to perform in some sort of
fashion from the 19th day of June 1973, until approximately
the 1st of September 1973, when Remco was required to
step in and complete their job. During this period of time
they continued to accept payment and made no mention of
the breach. By waiving the right Triangle may have had,
they were required to perform pursuant to the contract
terms, but failed to do so.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING AN ATTORNEY'S FEE TO TRIANGLE AND FAILING TO
AWARD AN ATTORNEY'S FEE TO REMCO.
On the question of awarding attorney's fees, this Court
has previously spoken in Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 130,
417 P2d 246. In that case the parties entered into a contract
for building a house for cost, plus ten percent. As in the
present case, as performance continued certain controversies arose regarding the amount of payment for the
work performed, although the house involved was completed. The defendant claimed that the total amount owing
including his ten percent was $49,630.00 The jury awarded
the sum of $43,000.00 and found that the plaintiff was enDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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titled to an offset of $1,230.22. The claim of Triangle in the
present case was $13,216.61 and, excluding the interest and
attorney's fee, they were awarded $4,064.94. Reduced to
percentages there was a 16 percent differential in the
Shupecase as compared to a 69 percent differential in the
present case. The statement of the Court in theShupe case
which is applicable here is:
4

The final claim of error we give attention to is
the trial court's refusal of defendant's request for
attorney fees and costs. The pertinent statutes
are:
'Section 38-1-17.— As between the owner and the
contractor the court shall apportion the costs
according to the right of the case, but in all cases
each subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall have his
costs awarded to him, including the co^ts of
preparing and recording the notice of claim of lien
and such reasonable attorney's fee as may be
incurred in preparing and recording said notice of
claim of lien. 'Section 38-1-18. - In any action
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the
successful party shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court,
which shall be taxed as costs in this action.'
(Emphasis added).
It is plain that these two sections relating to this
subject should be construed together and that
when attorney fees are awardable thereunder
they are to be treated as costs which, as expressed
in 38-1-17 the court 'shall apportion the costs according to the right of the case'. Viewing the
overall picture of this case in the light most
favorable to the facts as found by the jury and to
the verdict and judgment we cannot say that the
trial court abused its discretion in rejecting
defendant's contentions."
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Remco would concede that Triangle was the successful
party in the matter in the sense that they were awarded
the full amount they then claimed as due and owing in the
sum of $4,064.94, but certainly it was substantially different than the claim in August of $13,216.61. However,
even assuming that the Court made no errors in its findings, conclusions and judgment, it is submitted that the
Court did not apportion the costs according to the right of
the case even in viewing the overall picture of the case in
the light most favorable to the facts as found by the Court.
This would certainly be the case if the percentage
precedent of Shupe v. Menlove is followed.
CONCLUSION
The performance of both parties to the sub-contract
agreement was certainly less than perfect. Remco was
over a month late in paying the material supplier,
Triangle failed to keep a sufficient number of men on the
job to keep up with the other trades, they sublet much of
their work, and they left the job without completing it.
Financial problems beset both, so rather than Remco
making monthly payments as provided in the agreement,
they were made for the purpose of maintaining Triangle's
performance. Certainly the evidence establishes a breach
on the part of Triangle in many aspects of the agreement.
If Triangle was to have claimed a breach, such action
should have been taken at the time of such breach, which
was not done. By continuing to perform, they waived the
breach and should be held to the damages resulting from
their non-performance, which damages amounted to
award granted by the Court plus the payment of $2,583.62
which was in excess of the contract price, or a total of
$6,973.56, excluding the attorney's fee award. The total
amount set forth is also the monetary amount lost by
Remco when it forfeited its right to performance. Remco
submits that such a forfeiture is greatly disproportionate
to the damages actually sustained by Triangle.
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The abuse of the lien law by Triangle should be carefully
scrutinized by this Court. Under the circumstances which
existed at the time of filing the lien, for the excessive
amount indicated, it may have been justified. The real
abuse came when Triangle refused to cancel the lien some
ten months later, knowing that all its sublet contractors
and materialmen had been paid, and knowing that its
claim was $4,064.94. In requiring them to place $13,216.61
with the Court, it became an aggravated abuse which
should not be condoned. This is precisely the type of
situation where the $20.00 daily penalty, provided for in
UCA 38-1-24, should apply.
The aggravated abuse of the lien law as exerted by
Triangle, should not be considered as the "right of the
case" as required by statue in determining an award of
attorney's fees and the award granted by the Court should
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
CARL T. SMITH
Attorney for Appellant
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